We use a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly external equity as a laboratory to study the relations between stock returns and equity financing decisions. Simulations show that the model can simultaneously and in many cases quantitatively reproduce: procyclical equity issuance; the negative relation between aggregate equity share and future aggregate returns; long-term underperformance following equity issuance and the positive relation of its magnitude with the volume of issuance; the meanreverting operating performance of issuing and cash-distributing firms; as well as the positive long-term drift following cash distribution and its positive relation with bookto-market. We conclude that systematic mispricing seems unnecessary to explain the return-related evidence often interpreted as behavioral underreaction to market timing.
Introduction
We study the dynamic, quantitative relations between stock returns and equity financing decisions using a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly external equity.
The issue is important. Recent literature in empirical corporate finance has uncovered an array of evidence often interpreted as suggesting a window-of-opportunity theory of financing decisions in response to systematic mispricing in equity markets. In particular, Ritter (1991 Ritter ( , 2003 argues that managers can create value for existing shareholders by timing financing decisions to take advantage of time-varying relative costs of debt and equity caused by market inefficiencies. Managers can issue equity when their stock prices are high and turn to internal funds or debt when stock prices are low. And investors underreact to the pricing implications of this timing behavior. As supporting evidence, Ritter cites many empirical studies that document long-run abnormal returns following corporate financing events.
We deliberately do not incorporate any behavioral bias into our model. We assume that firms choose investment and financing decisions optimally in response to aggregate and firmspecific productivity shocks. Firm-specific shocks affect corporate decisions through operating cash flows. And aggregate shocks affect corporate decisions through both operating cash flows and an exogenously-specified stochastic discount factor (Berk, Green, and Naik 1999) .
We find that our neoclassical model can reproduce simultaneously, and in many cases quantitatively, many stylized facts often interpreted as behavioral underreaction to market timing. These stylized facts include: (i) the amount and frequency of equity issuance are procyclical (Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 1993); (ii) the new equity share in total amount of financing is a significantly negative predictor of aggregate stock market returns (Baker and Wurgler 2000) ; (iii) firms conducting seasoned equity offerings underperform nonissuing firms with similar size and book-to-market in the long run, and the magnitude of this underperformance increases with the volume of issuance (Loughran and Ritter 1995; Spiess and Afflect-Graves 1995) ; (iv) the operating performance of issuing firms exhibits substantial improvements prior to the equity offerings, but then deteriorates, and issuing firms are also disproportionately high-investing, high-growth firms (Loughran and Ritter 1997); (v) there exists a positive long-term stock price drift for firms distributing cash back to shareholders, and the magnitude of the drift is stronger among value firms (Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1990; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995) ;
(vi) relative to industry peers, firms that announce repurchases exhibit superior operating performance, but the relative performance declines following the program announcements (Lie 2005) ; and finally (vii) capital investment is negatively associated with future stock returns in the cross section, and the magnitude of this association is stronger among firms with higher cash flows (Titman, Wei, and Xie 2004; Polk and Sapienza 2005; Xing 2005; Anderson and Garcia-Feijóo 2006) . Overall, our quantitative results suggest that systematic mispricing seems unnecessary to explain the evidence often interpreted as behavioral underreaction to market timing, or more generally, the window-of-opportunity theory of financing decisions.
The intuition underlying our results is simple. First, controlling for expected productivity, firms with lower costs of capital invest more; all else equal, the investment-to-asset ratio correlates negatively with expected returns. Second, the balance-sheet constraint equating the sources of funds with the uses of funds implies that equity issuing firms are disproportionally high investment-to-asset firms and cash-distributing firms are disproportionally low investment-to-asset firms. The negative investment-return relation then implies that equity issuance should correlate negatively with expected returns, and that cash distribution (dividend or share repurchase) should correlate positively with expected returns.
Third, because expected productivity is procyclical, capital investment is also procyclical, a common prediction across neoclassical models (Kydland and Prescott 1982) and a fact well-documented in the business cycle literature (King and Rebelo 1999) . The balance-sheet constraint then implies that new equity share must be procyclical and predict stock market returns with a negative sign because the aggregate expected return is countercyclical.
Fourth, firm-level profitability is mean-reverting in the model as well as in the data (Fama and French 1995 . Ex-post, equity issuers tend to be firms that have recently experienced sizable positive firm-specific profitability shocks. But going forward, issuers face the same distribution of shocks as other firms do. When looking back at the historical data, econometricians are likely to observe that the operating performance of issuing firms displays substantial improvements before the issuance but deteriorates afterwards.
Our work connects naturally with several recent theoretical papers. In the context of initial public offerings, Pástor and Veronesi (2005) develop a model of optimal timing in which waves of initial offerings are driven by declines in expected market returns, increases in expected aggregate profitability, and increases in prior uncertainty about the average future profitability of new firms. Our insights complement theirs because we study the powerful role of capital investment in raising and distributing capital for publicly traded firms and its impact on the cross section of expected returns. Further, differing from the Pástor and Veronesi (2003, 2005) valuation framework in the spirit of Ohlson (1995) , our model is rooted in neoclassical economics in the spirit of Abel (1983) and Cochrane (1991) . Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005a) construct a real options model and argue that prior to equity issuance, a firm has an expansion option and some assets in place. This composition is levered and risky. If the exercise of the option is financed by equity, risk must drop. This mechanism can explain the long-term underperformance following equity issuance. Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005b) document related empirical evidence. We extend their work by analyzing simultaneously the negative long-term drift following equity issuance and the positive long-term drift following cash distribution in a unified framework.
In contrast, Carlson et al. leave the cash-distribution side largely open. Moreover, by modeling business cycles explicitly, our model can generate the procyclical equity issuance waves and the negative predictive relation between the new equity share and stock market returns.
We also extend Zhang (2006) by solving explicitly a fully-specified neoclassical model.
The fully-specified model allows us to use computational experiments to evaluate how well our economic mechanisms can reproduce quantitatively the stylized facts in question. While the match of model moments to data moments is by no means perfect, our simulations show that these mechanisms are quantitatively relevant, if not important. We also offer an array of additional insights, for example, the procyclical equity issuance, the predictive relation between the new equity share and stock market returns, the positive relation between the volume of issuance and the magnitude of the underperformance, and the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing firms and cash-distributing firms.
Several papers cast some doubt on behavioral market timing, but from the perspective of capital structure. Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that the persistence of leverage is likely to be driven by dynamic optimizing behavior with adjustment costs. Hennessy and Whited (2005) construct a dynamic trade-off model with endogenous leverage, payout, and investment and show that leverage varies negatively with an external-finance-weighted-average Q ratio (Baker and Wurgler 2002) . Strebulaev (2003) constructs a dynamic trade-off model of capital structure and shows that his model can reproduce the empirical relation between leverage and stock returns (Welch 2004) . Liu (2005) shows that historical market-to-book and stock return obtain their explanatory power of leverage because of adjustment costs and the time-varying nature of the target leverage. None of these papers studies the predictive relations between past financing decisions and future stock returns, relations often interpreted as behavioral market timing. We fill this gap.
More generally, our work is related to the literature that aims to understand the economic determinants of the cross section of returns from the value-maximization perspective of firms (Berk 1995; Naik 1999, 2004; Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang 2003; Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino 2004; Kogan 2004; Zhang 2005; Belo 2006; Cooper 2006; Gala 2006) . These papers generally do not focus on the relations between financing decisions and stock returns. We contribute to the literature along this line.
Our rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We construct our dynamic model in Section 2 and present our quantitative results in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the implications of our theoretical results in the context of related empirical literature. And Section 5 concludes.
The Model
This section constructs and solves a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly equity financing. Section 2.1 describes the model structure and Section 2.2 discusses basic properties of the model solution.
The Structure
We start by describing the technology and the stochastic discount factor in the economy. We then delineate how firms maximize their market value by making their investment, financ-ing, and payout decisions. Finally, we discuss how risk and expected returns are determined endogenously in connection with these corporate policies. Our model structure is somewhat similar to that in Zhang (2005) , who focuses on the value premium. It is reassuring, to us at least, that models with similar microeconomic foundations can be used to confront different anomalies, even though these anomalies are often treated in different empirical literatures.
Technology
Production requires one input, capital, k t , and is subject to both an aggregate productivity shock and an idiosyncratic productivity shock. The aggregate shock, x t , has a stationary and monotone Markov transition function, Q x (x t+1 |x t ), and is given by:
where ε x t+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal variable. The aggregate shock is the unique source of systematic risk; otherwise all firms will have expected returns equal to the real interest rate.
In the model, the firm-specific shock is the unique source of firm heterogeneity. The firmspecific shock, z jt , is uncorrelated across firms, indexed by j, and have a common stationary and monotone Markov transition function, Q z (z jt+1 |z jt ), given by:
where ε z jt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal variable. ε z jt+1 and ε z it+1 are uncorrelated for any pair (i, j) with i = j. Moreover, ε x t+1 is independent of ε z jt+1 for all j.
The production function is given by:
where y jt and k jt are the operating profits and capital stock of firm j at time t, respectively, and where 0 < α < 1, so the production displays decreasing return to scale. f denotes nonnegative fixed costs of production that must be paid each period by firms in production.
Stochastic Discount Factor
Following Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) , we specify exogenously the stochastic discount factor. This strategy seems reasonable because we aim to link expected returns to firm characteristics through value-maximizing corporate policies.
Let m t+1 denote the stochastic discount factor from time t to t+1. We specify
where 1 > η > 0, γ 0 > 0, and γ 1 < 0 are constant parameters. Equation (4) is in essence a reduced-form representation of the intertemporal rate of substitution for a fictitious representative consumer. To capture the time-varying price of risk, equation (5) assumes that γ t decreases in the demeaned aggregate productivity, x t −x. 1
Corporate Policies
Upon observing the current aggregate and firm-specific productivity levels, firm j chooses optimal investment, i jt , to maximize its market value. The capital accumulation follows:
where δ denotes the depreciation rate, which is constant across time and across firms.
Capital investment entails quadratic adjustment costs, denoted c jt :
The adjustment-cost function satisfies that ∂c/∂i > 0, ∂ 2 c/∂i 2 > 0, and ∂c/∂k < 0. In other words, both the total and the marginal costs increase with the level of investment. The total adjustment cost also decreases with capital, displaying economy of scale.
When the sum of investment, i jt , and adjustment cost, c jt , exceeds internal funds, y jt , the firm raises new equity capital, e jt , from the external equity markets:
We assume that the equity is the only source of external financing. This simplification is reasonable because we focus on the dynamic relations between stock returns and equity financing decisions. The relation between stock returns and debt offerings is also interesting (Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1999) , but incorporating debt into the neoclassical framework makes the model much more complicated, if not infeasible. 2 We thus leave that topic for future research.
External equity financing is costly (Smith (1977) , Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996) , Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) ). To capture this effect, we follow Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2005) and assume that for each dollar of external equity raised by the firm, it must pay proportional flotation costs. We also capture fixed costs of equity finance. The total financing-cost function is hence parameterized as:
where λ 0 > 0 captures the fixed costs, 1 {e jt >0} is the indicator function that takes the value of one if the event described in {·} occurs, and λ 1 e jt > 0 captures the proportional costs.
When the sum of investment and adjustment cost is lower than internal funds, the firm pays the difference back to shareholders. The payout, d jt , is thus:
The firm does not incur any costs when paying dividends or conducting share repurchase.
We do not model corporate cash holdings or the specific forms of the payout because these ingredients are not necessary for our economic questions at hand. Equation (10) only pins 2 Two factors contribute to the complexity of the model framework with debt. First, introducing debt forces the model to confront the "curse-of-dimension" problem. The model with debt must have four state variables, including capital, debt, aggregate productivity, and firm-specific productivity, and two control variables, including the beginning-of-next-period capital and debt. Second, unlike Hennessy and Whited (2005) who calibrate their model to the annual frequency, our asset pricing applications require that we calibrate our model to the monthly frequency. This higher frequency lowers the speed of convergence in the value-function-iteration algorithm used to solve the model. See Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2005) for a recent attempt to incorporate debt into the neoclassical framework; in particular, it takes about 16 days for their computer program to solve the model for one parameter profile. down the total amount paid to shareholders, but not the methods of distribution.
Because there are costs associated with raising capital, but not with distributing payout, firms will only use external equity as the last resort when internal funds are not sufficient to finance current investment. Equivalently, it is never optimal to issue new equity while paying cash back to shareholders.
Dynamic Value Maximization
Let v(k jt , z jt , x t ) denote the market value of equity for firm j. And define:
d jt is the effective cash accrued to the shareholder that equals cash distribution minus the sum of external equity raised and the financing costs. We can now formulate the dynamic value-maximizing problem for firm j as follows:
subject to the capital accumulation equation (6).
Risk and Expected Return
In our model, risk and expected returns are determined endogenously along with valuemaximizing corporate policies. Evaluating the value function at the optimum yields:
where firm j's stock return is defined as:
Note that v(k jt , z jt , x t ) is the cum-dividend firm value. Define p jt ≡ v jt − d jt to be the exdividend firm value, then r jt+1 reduces to the usual definition, r jt+1 = p jt+1 + e d jt+1 p jt . We can rewrite equation (13) as the beta-pricing form (Cochrane 2001, p. 19 ):
where r f t ≡ 1 Et[m t+1 ] is the real interest rate from period t to t+1. Risk is defined by:
and the price of risk is defined by:
From equations (15) and (16), it is clear that risk and expected returns are two endogenous variables to be determined along with optimal firm-value and policy functions.
All endogenous variables are functions of three state variables, the endogenous state, k jt , and two exogenous states, x t and z jt . The functional forms are not available analytically but they can be obtained using numerical techniques.
The Model Solution
We now discuss basic properties of the model solution.
Calibration
To solve the model, we first need to calibrate 14 parameters (α,x, ρ x , σ x , ρ z , σ z , η, f , γ 0 , γ 1 , δ, a, λ 0 , and λ 1 ) by matching at least 14 moments. The success of this procedure depends on picking moments that can identify these parameters. A sufficient condition for identification is a one-to-one mapping between the vector of parameters and a subset of the data moments with the same dimension. Although the model does not yield such a closed-form mapping, we exercise care in choosing appropriate moments to match.
To be consistent with the empirical literature, we calibrate all the parameters in monthly frequency. We start with three aggregate return moments including the mean and volatility of real interest rate and the average Sharpe ratio. As in Zhang (2005) , we use these three moments to pin down tightly the three parameters in the stochastic discount factor. 3 The 3 Specifically, the log pricing kernel in equations (4) and (5) implies that the real interest rate
. The long-run average level of the aggregate productivityx is purely a scaling variable. We choose its numerical value to be −3.751 such that the average long-run level of assets is approximately one.
persistence of the aggregate productivity, ρ x , is set to be 3 √ 0.95, and its conditional volatility, σ x , is set to be 0.007/3 = 0.0023. With the first-order autoregressive specification for x t in equation (1), these monthly parameter values correspond to quarterly values of 0.95 and 0.007, respectively, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) . To choose the persistence ρ z and conditional volatility σ z of the firm-specific productivity, we follow Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) and restrict these two parameters using the cross-sectional moments of firm distribution. One direct measure of the dispersion is the cross-sectional volatility of individual stock returns. Another measure is the cross-sectional standard deviation of market-to-book. These goals are achieved by setting ρ z = 0.965 and σ z = 0.10.
Following Hennessy and Whited (2005) , we target five simple summary statistics: the mean and volatility of investment-to-asset, the average ratio of operating income to assets, the frequency of equity issuance, and the average ratio of net equity to assets. The average investment-to-asset helps identify the depreciation rate δ, the volatility of investment-toasset helps identify the adjustment-cost parameter a, the average operating income-to-asset ratio helps identify the curvature of the production function α, and the two financing variables help identify the financing-cost parameters λ 0 and λ 1 . In particular, we set λ 0 = 0.08 and λ 1 = 0.025, which are very close to the parameter values used in Gomes (2001) . Finally, we choose the fixed cost, f , to match the average market-to-book ratio to that in the data. Table 1 reports our calibration of parameter values. These parameter values are generally close to those that have appeared in previous studies. We then use this parametrization to solve the model based on the value-function-iteration technique.
The Numerical Algorithm
To solve the dynamic value-maximization problem given in equation (12), we use the discrete state-space value-function-iteration methods described by Burnside (1999) .
Specifically, we use a grid with 50 points for the capital stock with an upper bound k.
The upper bound is large enough to be nonbinding at all times. We construct the grid for capital stock recursively, following McGrattan (1999), i.e., k i = k i−1 + c k1 exp (c k2 (i − 2)),
where i = 1, . . . , 50 is the index of grid points and c k1 and c k2 are two constants chosen to provide the desired number of grid points and k, given a pre-specified lower bound k. This recursive construction assigns more grid points around k, where the value function has most of its curvature. The state variables x and z in equations (1) and (2), respectively, are defined on continuous state spaces. And to compute the numerical solution to the model, we need to transform the continuous state spaces into discrete state spaces. Because both productivity processes are highly persistent in monthly frequency, we use the method described in Rouwenhorst (1995) . We use 15 grid points for x process and 17 points for z process. In all cases our quantitative results are robust to finer grids.
Once the discrete state space is available, the conditional expectation operator in (12) can be carried out as a matrix multiplication. The expected
can be calculated in the same way. We use piecewise linear interpolation extensively to obtain firm value, optimal investment, and expected return, which do not lie directly on the grid points. Finally, we use discrete, global search routine in maximizing the right-hand side of the value function (12). This routine is slow but precise. Specifically, we compute the objective function on an even-spaced grid of k, with boundary [k, k] with 20,000 points. 4
Basic Properties of the Model Solution
Once the model is solved numerically, we can simulate the model using the value function and optimal policy functions to create an artificial panel of 5000 firms with 480 monthly observations for each firm. This procedure is repeated 100 times. Table 2 reports the crosssimulation averaged sample moments.
The overall fit reported in Table 2 seems reasonable. The mean and volatility of risk-free rate and the average Sharpe ratio simulated from the model are very close to those observed in the data. This fit is perhaps not surprising because we pin down three parameters, η, γ 0 , and γ 1 , using exactly these three moments. The model moments of the investment-to-asset ratio are also close to its data moments. The average market-to-book ratio in the model, 1.88, is close to that in the data, 1.49.
One caveat is that the frequency of equity issuance in the model, 28.5%, is much higher than that in the data, 9.9%. The reason is probably that in the model external equity is the only source of outside funds. Another reason is that seasoned equity is not the only way that public firms can use to issue equity. For example, Fama and French (2005) document that, in addition to seasoned equity, firms issue equity in mergers and through private placements, convertible debt, warrants, direct purchase plans, rights issues, and employee options, grants, and benefit plans. And during 1973 to 1982, on average 67% of sample firms issue some equity each year, and the proportion rises to 74% for 1983 to 1992.
More important, Figure 1 plots our numerical solutions of the value function and the optimal investment policy against the endogenous state variable, capital stock k, and the two exogenous state variables, aggregate productivity x and firm-specific productivity z. Because there are three state variables, we first fix x =x and plot the functions against k and z in Panels A and C. We then fix z =z and plot the functions against k and x in Panels B and D. From Panels A and B, because of decreasing return to scale, firm value is increasing and concave function of capital k. The value function also increases with aggregate productivity x and firm-specific productivity z. From Panels C and D, investment-to-asset decreases with capital stock k but increases with aggregate and firm-specific productivity. Our model thus predicts that small firms with relatively less assets-in-place and growth firms with relatively high profitability tend to invest more and grow faster, consistent with Fama and French (1995) .
Based on the optimal investment policy, Figure 2 plots the new equity-to-asset ratio and the payout-to-asset ratio given by equations (8) and (10), respectively. From Panels A and B, the new equity-to-asset ratio closely mimics the patterns of the investment-to-asset ratio.
Small firms with relatively less capital and growth firms with relatively high firm-specific productivity tend to issue more equity. This prediction is largely consistent with the evidence documented by Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) and Fama and French (2005) . Panel B also implies that firms tend to use more equity when aggregate economic conditions are relatively good or when x is high, a pattern consistent with Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993).
Moreover, from Panels C and D, the payout-to-asset ratio largely increases with capital.
Small firms with less assets distribute relatively little cash, while big firms with more assets distribute more. This prediction is largely consistent with Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) , who report that dividend yields are positively correlated with the log of total sales, a measure of firm size. Panel C shows further that firms with relatively high profitability distribute more capital than firms with relatively low profitability, a prediction consistent with the evidence in Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) and Lie (2005) .
Quantitative Results
This section investigates whether our model can quantitatively reproduce the relations between stock returns and financing decisions that have recently attracted considerable attention in empirical corporate finance. We follow the quantitative-theory approach of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) to conduct computational experiments to compare the model moments with those in the data. Specifically, we simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5,000 firms and 480 months. The sample size is largely comparable to the COMPUSTAT data set often used in empirical studies. We then implement the exact procedures from seven high-profile empirical studies on each artificial panel, report cross-simulation averaged results, and compare them to their counterparts in the real data.
We aim at a broad range of empirical studies in the literature. We first study the cyclical properties of equity issuance as applied to equity issuance waves and the predictive relations between the new equity share and aggregate stock market returns. Then we examine the longrun stock-price performance and operating performance of issuing firms, as well as the longrun stock-price performance and operating performance of cash-distributing firms. Finally, we generate the negative investment-return relation at the heart of our economic mechanisms.
Equity Issuance Waves
A larger number of firms issue common stocks and the proportion of external financing accounted for by equity is substantially higher in economic expansions (Taggart 1977; Marsh 1982; Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 1993) . Choe et al. document that the relative frequency of equity offers, defined as the number of equity offerings per month scaled by the number of listed firms, and the dollar volume of security offerings scaled by CPI are both procyclical.
And in multiple regressions, the new equity share, defined as the ratio of common stock issues to the sum of common stock and bond issues in dollar volume per month, increases with busi-ness cycle measures such as the growth rate of industrial production, and decreases with stock market volatility. Finally, neither stock market run-up nor interest rate changes have significant explanatory power in the presence of business cycle measures and stock market volatility.
We ask whether our model can reproduce these empirical patterns. Following Zhang (2005), we define expansions in artificial data to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional standard deviation above its long-run average, i.e.,
And we define contractions to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional standard deviation below its long-run average, i.e.,
We measure the relative frequency of equity issuance in the model as and exit is likely to reinforce our basic results. The reason is that the frequency of entry in the form of initial public offerings tends to be procyclical and the frequency of exit or delisting tends to be countercyclical, as shown in Pastor and Veronesi (2005).
We define the rate of aggregate equity financing as the total amount of new equity divided by total assets:
. And because we do not model debt, we define the new equity share as the share of new equity out of total amount of financing or the sum of new equity and internal funds: P N j=1 e jt P N j=1 (e jt +y jt ) . We caution that our definition of the equity share does not correspond exactly with the definition in the empirical literature (Baker and Wurgler 2000) .
But our definition at least seems to capture the essence underlying the new equity share without complicating drastically the basic model structure.
Using simulated panels, we compute the average frequency of equity issuance, the average rate of aggregate equity financing, and the average new equity share conditional on the economy being in expansions or contractions. Table 3 reports the results. We observe that equity issuance is strongly procyclical. The relative frequency of equity issuance is 82.5% in expansions, and is only 1.5% in contractions. The rate of aggregate equity financing is 3.0% in expansions and is 0.2% in contractions. Finally, the new equity share is 52.6% in expansions and is only 3.6% in contractions. This procyclical pattern in our simulations is consistent with the evidence in Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) .
We also use simulated data to regress contemporaneously the rate of aggregate equity financing and the new equity share onto the growth rate of aggregate output, defined as
, prior six-month stock market returns, defined as
, and stock market volatility estimated with the rolling prior 36 months of simulated data. From Table   4 , the results are largely consistent with Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) . In particular, the rate of aggregate equity financing and the new equity share both correlate positively with the growth rate of industrial production and with the stock market returns.
Stock Market Predictability Associated with the New Equity Share
Baker and Wurgler (2000) show that the share of new equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong, negative predictor of future stock market returns. Baker and Wurgler interpret this evidence as suggesting that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing equity to exploit systematic mispricing in market returns.
We show that our model without mispricing can largely replicate the Baker and Wurgler (2000) evidence. Specifically, we perform univariate, predictive regressions of one-year-ahead stock market returns on the dividend yield, defined in the model as
, on the aggregate book-to-market, defined as
, and on the new equity share. Following Baker and Wurgler, we standardize all the predictors so that they have zero mean and unit variance. The rationale is to make the slope coefficients of different regressors comparable to each other. And as dependent variables, we use annual percentage returns on both valueweighted and equal-weighted market portfolios. Table 5 reports the results. The model largely reproduces the predictive regression results obtained in the data. The dividend yield and the aggregate book-to-market ratio are both significantly positive predictors of future stock market returns. More important, the new equity share is a significantly negative predictor of future stock market returns.
We caution again that our definition of the equity share in the model does not correspond exactly with that in Baker and Wurgler (2000) . This difference makes direct comparison be-tween our simulation results and their evidence somewhat difficult. However, our definition does seem to capture the basic intuition underlying the predictive power of the new equity share, i.e., the strong procyclicality of the new equity share gives rise to its negative correlation with the countercyclical aggregate expected returns.
Underperformance Following Seasoned Equity Offerings
Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that firms issuing equity earn much lower returns on average over the next three to five years than nonissuing firms with similar characteristics (see also Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995) . The magnitude of this underperformance varies over time. Firms issuing during light issuance periods do not underperform much, while firms issuing during high-volume periods severely underperform.
To study whether our model can quantitatively generate this evidence, we replicate the central result in Loughran and Ritter (1995) reported in their Table VIII . Specifically, we use simulated panels to perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of percentage stock returns onto the market value, book-to-market, and an issue dummy:
where r jt+1 is the percentage return on stock j in from the beginning of month t to the beginning of month t+1, and all the regressors are dated at the beginning of month t.
We define market value in the model to be the ex-dividend firm value, v jt − d jt , and bookto-market to be
. Following Loughran and Ritter (1995) , we evaluate ME jt as the market value of equity of firm j on the most recent fiscal year that ended prior to the month t. Similarly, BM jt is the book-to-market ratio of firm j on the most recent fiscal year that ended prior to the month t. And ISSUE jt is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if firm j has conducted one or more equity issues within the previous five years, and zero otherwise, i.e., ISSUE jt ≡ 1 { P 59 τ =0 e jt−τ >0} . We also halve the sample into months following light issuance activity and months following heavy issuance activity. Specifically, we partition the sample on the basis of the fraction of the sample firms in a month that have issued equity during the prior five years. The light-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction below its median, and the heavy-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction above its median.
From Table 6 , the model does a decent job in reproducing the empirical evidence. When the issue dummy is used alone, issuing firms underperform by 0.49% per month in the data with a t-statistic of −3.98. And its model counterpart is 0.99% per month with a t-statistic of −3.87. Controlling for size and book-to-market in the regressions reduces the underperformance to 0.38% in the data and to 0.64% in the model, and both are significant.
More important, the model also reproduces quantitatively the positive relation between the magnitude of the underperformance and the volume of equity issuance. In the last two regressions in Table 6 , we divide the sample periods into months following light issuance activity and months following heavy issuance activity. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that issuing firms underperform by an insignificant amount of only 0.17% per month following light issuance activity but by a significant amount of 0.60% following heavy issuance activity. From the last column, issuing firms following light issuance activity in the model underperform by an insignificant 0.32% per month, while issuing firms following heavy issuance activity underperform by a significant 0.95% per month.
Operating Performance Following Seasoned Equity Offerings
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that the operating performance of issuing firms displays substantial improvement prior to the equity offerings, but then deteriorates.
Issuing firms are also disproportionately high-investing and high-growth firms. The authors interpret their evidence as consistent with the Jensen (1993) hypothesis that corporate culture excessively focuses on growth, and managers are as overoptimistic about the future profitability of the issuing firms as outside investors.
We show that our neoclassical model can quantitatively reproduce the Loughran and Ritter (1997) evidence. To this end, we use simulated panels to replicate their Table II by reporting the medians of the operating performance for issuing firms and matching firms for nine years around the issuance. Specifically, following Loughran and Ritter, we choose matching nonissuers by matching each issuing firm with a firm that has not issued equity during the prior five years as follows. If there is at least one nonissuer with end-of-year zero assets within 25 to 200 percent of the issuing firm, the nonissuer with the closest operating income-to-asset ratio is used. 5 We also report the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the issuers and nonissuers using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, and the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the changes in the ratios from year 0 to year +4. 6 Under the null hypothesis that the issuer and the nonissuer measures are drawn from the same distribution, Z follows a standard normal distribution.
We consider four operating performance measures: (i) OIBD/assets, where OIBD denotes operating income before depreciation, measured as Ritter (1997) , issuers in the model experience deterioration in the operating performance.
After equity issuance, the operating income-to-asset ratios and profitability of issuers become significantly lower than those of nonissuers. However, the model-implied operating incometo-asset and profitability levels are on average much higher than those observed in the data.
The reason is probably that the denominator in the model variables corresponds to the fixed assets, which are only part of the total assets in the data.
What drives the deteriorating accounting performance of firms after issuing equity? Intuitively, the firm-level profitability in the model is driven by the persistent and mean-reverting firm-specific productivity in equation (2). Therefore, ex-post, issuers tend to be firms that have recently experienced extremely high firm-specific shocks, ε z jt+1 . But going forwards, issuers face the same conditional, standard normal distribution of these shocks as other firms do. When we as econometricians look at the historical sample, we are likely to observe the mean-reverting behavior in the cross-sectional difference in productivity, z jt , measured 5 In the real data, if no nonissuer meets this criterion, Loughran and Ritter (1997) then rank all nonissuers with year 0 assets of 90 to 110 percent of the issuer, and the firm with the closest, but higher operating income-to-asset ratio is used. Because we do not distinguish different industries in the model, we simply use the 25 to 200 percent restriction on end-of-year zero assets to choose matching nonissuer. 6 Denote the difference in the accounting measure between issuer i and its matching firm by diff i ≡ measure(issuer i )− measure(nonissuer i ). We rank the absolute values of the diff i from 1 to N e , the total number of issuing firms. We then sum the ranks of positive values of diff i , and denote the sum with D. empirically as the differences in profitability between issuers and matching nonissuers. Table 7 also shows that issuers in the model have persistently higher investment-to-asset and market-to-book ratios than matching nonissuers. From Panel C, these differences are mostly significant. Moreover, the model also capture the mean-reverting behavior of the investment-to-asset and market-to-book ratios.
Long-Term Performance Following Cash Distribution
When firms raise capital, they underperform matching firms in the future three to five years.
But when firms distribute cash back to shareholders, they outperform matching firms. For example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) show that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return after the announcements of open market share repurchases is 12.1% in 1980-1990. And the average abnormal return is 45.3% for value firms, but is insignificantly negative for growth firms. Similarly, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) show that stock prices continue to drift in the same direction in the years following the announcements of dividend initiations and omissions.
To study whether our model can quantitatively generate these empirical results, we
replicate Tables 3 and 4 in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) using our simulated panels. In the model, we identify firms with positive dividends as those conducting stock repurchase in the data. Our model only pins down the total amount of payout, not its specific forms: the Miller-Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevancy theorem holds in our neoclassical model. We report mean annual returns from buying an equally-weighted portfolio of repurchasing firms, beginning in the month following the repurchase and for the subsequent four years. We also report total compounded returns for up to four years, and compare the returns of the cash-distributing firms to the returns of the reference portfolio.
We follow closely Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) in forming our reference portfolio. All firms in our simulated panel are sorted each month into one of 50 size and bookto-market portfolios by taking the intersections of ten size deciles and five book-to-market quintiles. All firms are ranked at the beginning of calendar year and are held for the following 12 months. Beginning in the next month, the one-year buy-and-hold return is calculated for each firm in a given portfolio. We use the equally-weighted average of all annual returns in a given portfolio as the benchmark return for the firms ranked in that particular size and book-to-market portfolio. The ranking of a particular firm may change from year to year.
To accommodate this feature, we allow the benchmark to change over time. Table 8 reports annual buy-and-hold returns and compounded holding period returns up to four years following share repurchases, both in the data and in the model. The table shows that cash-distributing firms indeed earn higher average returns than nondistributing firms. But the magnitudes of the differences seem much lower in the simulated data.
We also examine the annual buy-and-hold returns and compounded holding-period returns following cash distribution by book-to-market quintiles. We rank all firms into size deciles, and further sort each decile into book-to-market quintiles. The lowest book-tomarket ratios are assigned to quintile one. We form the reference portfolio using benchmark returns corresponding to the repurchase sample, matched on size and book-to-market.
From Table 9 , the model can reproduce the empirical pattern that the magnitude of the long-run stock-price drift following cash distribution is stronger in value firms than that in growth firms (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995, Table 4 ). However, the magnitudes of the drift in the model are again much lower than those observed in the data.
Operating Performance Following Cash Distribution
Lie (2005) studies the operating performance following announcements of open market share repurchases from 1981 to 2000. He finds that, relative to industry peers, firms that announce repurchases exhibit superior operating performance, but the relative performance declines following the announcements. However, the declining performance appears to be attributable to mean reversion. Relative to control firms with similar pre-event performance, firms that announce repurchases exhibit subsequent performance improvements.
To evaluate how well our model can capture this evidence quantitatively, we replicate the central finding reported in Table 3 Adjusted performance is the unadjusted performance less the performance for control firms. Following Lie (2005), we use two sets of control firms. The first set of composed of firms in the same industry that are similar in size measured as book value of assets. Because we do not model industry heterogeneity, we simply choose as the control firm the firm that has capital stock closest to that of the cash-distributing firm in the artificial samples.
The second set of control firms consists of firms in the same industry and have similar pre-event performance characteristics and market-to-book ratios. Specifically, for each cashdistributing firm, we first identify all firms with operating performance within ±20% of the performance of the cash-distributing firm in the announcement quarter (quarter 0), operating performance for the four quarters ending with the quarter 0 within ±20% of the corresponding performance for the cash-distributing firm, and pre-announcement market-tobook value of assets within ±20% of that of the cash-distributing firm. From these firms indexed by i, we choose the firm with the lowest sum of absolute differences, defined as:
|Performance Quarter 0, Cash−Distributing firm − Performance Quarter 0,Firm i | + |Performance Four quarters ending with quarter 0, Cash−Distributing firm − Performance Four quarters ending with quarter 0, Firm i | Table 10 reports the model-implied results along with those from Lie (2005). The unadjusted performance displays deteriorations in performance from the announcement quarter to future quarters. For example, the mean change of performance from quarter 0 to +4 is −0.40% in the data. And the mean change in the model is similar, −0.41%.
The industry-adjusted performance shows that, both in the data and in the model, cashdistributing firms perform better than their respective peers both before and after the announcements. Moreover, the superior performance tends to diminish over time, suggesting that performance tends to mean-revert.
The model fails to reproduce the empirical pattern that the changes in performanceadjusted performance from quarter 0 to future quarters show significant improvements. For example, the mean and median changes from quarter 0 to quarter +4 are 0.21% and 0.12% in the data, respectively. Assuming the performance decline for the control firms is a good proxy for the expected decline in the absence of repurchase announcements, Lie (2005) interprets this evidence as suggesting that cash-distributing firms exhibit a performance improvement relative to pre-event expectations. The mean and median changes in performance-adjusted performance from quarter 0 to quarter +4 in the model are both negative, −0.09% and −0.11%, respectively. It is likely that, because of our simple model structure in which the firm-specific productivity, z jt , is the single source of firm heterogeneity, matching on preevent performance adequately captures the expected decline in performance. For example, although largely negative, the performance-adjusted performance for cash-distributing firms in the model is very close to zero in magnitude.
Capital Investment, External Finance, and Stock Returns
The finance-related anomalies are intimately linked to the investment-return relation. Richardson and Sloan (2003) document that the negative relation between external finance and future stock returns varies systematically with the use of the proceeds. When the proceeds are invested in net operating assets as opposed to being stored as cash, there exists a stronger negative relation. And there is no evidence on the negative relation for refinancing transactions. Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2005) document that adding a return factor based on real investment into calendar-time factor regressions makes underperformance following equity issuances largely insignificant and reduces its magnitude by 37-46%. This evidence highlights the importance of capital investment in driving the financing-related anomalies.
To study the investment-return relation in our model, we reproduce the main empirical analysis of Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) To this end, we use simulated panels to form five portfolios based on capital investment (abbreviated as CI hereafter). Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), we define CI that corresponds to the portfolio formation year t as CI jt−1 = CE jt−1 (CE jt−2 +CE jt−3 +CE jt−4 )/3 − 1, where CE jt−1 is firm j's capital expenditure scaled by sales during year t−1. We measure CE jt−1 in the model as the investment-to-output ratio, i jt−1 y jt−1 , because the output price is normalized to be one. The last three-year moving-average capital expenditure in the denominator of CI jt−1 is used to project the firm's benchmark investment.
In the beginning of year t, we sort all firms into quintiles based on their year t − 1 CI measures in ascending order. The firms remain in these portfolios for the whole year t; the portfolios are rebalanced annually. We then construct a CI-spread portfolio that has a long position in the two lowest CI portfolios and a short position in the two highest CI portfolios.
The returns for this zero-cost portfolio are calculated by subtracting the average returns of the highest CI portfolios from the average returns of the lowest CI portfolios.
We also calculate the value-weighted monthly excess returns for each CI portfolio from year t to t + 1. Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) , we measure excess returns relative to benchmarks constructed to have similar firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market, and price momentum. Specifically, we form 125 benchmark portfolios that capture these characteristics. Starting in year t, the universe of common stocks is sorted into five portfolios based on firm size at the end of year t − 1. And the breakpoints for size are obtained by sorting all firms into quintiles based on their size measures at the end of year t−1 in ascending order. The size of each firm in our sample is then compared with the breakpoints to decide which portfolio the firm belongs to. Firms in each size portfolio are further equally sorted into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratio at the end of year t−1. Finally, the firms in each of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios are equally sorted into quintiles based on their prior-year return. In all, we obtain 125 benchmark portfolios.
We calculate excess returns using these 125 characteristic-based benchmark portfolios.
Each year, each stock is assigned to a benchmark portfolio according to its rank based on size, book-to-market, and prior returns. Excess monthly returns of a stock are then calculated by subtracting the returns of the corresponding benchmark portfolio from the returns of this particular stock. The excess returns on individual stocks are then used to calculate the value-weighted excess monthly returns on the test portfolios that are formed based on CI.
We also perform the following Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions
where r jt+1 is the benchmark-adjusted value-weighted return on individual stock j during period t. DCF is the dummy variable based on the cash flow, measured as operating income scaled by total assets, y jt k jt in the model. If firm j's cash flow is above the median cash flow of the year, DCF equals one, otherwise it equals zero. Table 11 reports the results both in the data and in the simulations. Consistent with Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) , Panel A reports that firms with low CI earn higher average returns than firms with high CI. The model-implied average CI-spread is 10.6% per annum, which falls somewhat short of that documented in the data, 16.9%. Panel B shows further that, consistent with Titman et al., there exists a negative correlation between future stock return and capital investment in the simulated data. And the magnitude of this correlation increases with the operating income-to-asset ratio, as shown by the negative slope of λ 2t for the interaction term, CI jt ×DCF jt . The model-implied slopes are also quantitatively similar to those observed in the data.
Empirical Implications
Our quantitative, theoretical results have important implications for the related literature on empirical corporate finance. The main point in this section is that our optimal-market-timing theory, built upon previous contributions of Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005a) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005) , is likely to be the more fundamental driving forces behind the external-financing anomalies than the leading explanations in the current literature. Each row of the table corresponds to one stylized fact about the external-financing anomalies. Each column corresponds to one explanation for the stylized facts. A check mark at the intersection of a row and a column suggests that the fact is consistent with the economic explanation. The block of Table 12 including the first nine rows and the first three columns is borrowed from Schultz's Table X. The rest of the table is new to our paper. There are three leading explanations for the external-financing anomalies in the current empirical literature. First, behavioral market timing argues that managers can create value for existing shareholders by timing financing decisions to exploit time-varying costs of debt and equity caused by inefficient markets. More important, investors underreact to the pricing implications of financing decisions, generating long-term stock price drifts following these decisions (Ritter 1991 (Ritter , 2003 Loughran and Ritter 1995; Spiess and Afflect-Graves 1995; Baker and Wurgler 2000) . Second, inadequate risk adjustment argues that the anomalies arise because empirical expected-return models are misspecified (Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 2000; Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 2000) . Third, pseudo market timing (Schultz 2003) argues that using event studies is likely to find long-term underperformance ex post, even though there is no underperformance ex ante. If early in a sample period, SEOs underperform, there will be few SEOs in the future because investors would have lower demands for them. And the average performance will be weighted more towards the early SEOs that underperformed.
If early SEOs outperform, there will be more SEOs in the future. And the early positive performance will be weighted less in the average performance. Weighing each period equally as in calendar-time factor regressions solves this problem.
More important, our optimal-market-timing theory and previous explanations are not mutually exclusive. As explained in depth below, our theory generates endogenous, structural relations between expected returns, financing decisions, and business cycles, thereby providing the microfoundation for the inadequate-risk-adjustment and the pseudo-markettiming explanations. While sympathetic to the idea of managerial market timing (Graham and Harvery 2001) , we disagree profoundly with the idea that investor underreaction explains the underperformance of firms raising capital.
We argue that behavioral underreaction to managerial timing is at best an incomplete explanation for the external-financing anomalies. From the fact that the announcement effects and the long-term stock price drifts following equity and debt offerings are both negative, it seems that investors underreact to the value-relevant information contained in these events.
However, the announcement effects of bank loan announcements and seasoned equity offerings in Japanese firms are both positive, even though their long-term stock price drifts are negative (Kang, Kim, and Stulz 1999; Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 2005) . According to the behavioral logic, this fact should suggest investor overreaction.
This logical inconsistency does not exist in our optimal-market-timing story. Intuitively, from the balance-sheet constraint, firms raising capital should invest more and earn lower expected returns, and firms distributing capital should invest less and earn higher expected returns. Moreover, short-term announcement effects and long-term stock-price drifts are likely to be driven by different economic forces, with the short-term effects resulting from asymmetric information and the long-term effects from time-varying expected returns in relation to capital investment. Raising capital through equity and debt in the U.S. is likely to signal negative news such as insufficient internal funds and the intrinsic value based on private information being lower than the market value based on public information. But raising capital through bank loans is likely to signal positive news because banks can monitor the operations in the firms because of their informational advantage from their ongoing, repeated relationships with the firms.
Our theory provides microeconomic foundations for the inadequate-risk-adjustment explanation. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) document that the underperformance following seasoned equity offerings is concentrated primarily in small-growth issuing firms, and suggest that the underperformance reflects a more pervasive return pattern related to size and bookto-market. Our quantitative results lend support to their argument because both equity issuers and small-growth firms in our model are firms with high investment-to-asset ratios. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) report that a multifactor asset pricing model can reduce the underperformance to an insignificant level, and argue that issuing firms are less risky because their leverage ratios are lowered as a result of equity issuance. We complement their work by suggesting that the investment mechanism can potentially explain their evidence. Consistent with our predictions, Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2005) show that adding a return factor based on capital investment into standard calendar-time factor regressions makes underperformance following seasoned equity offerings largely insignificant, and re-duces its magnitude by around 40%. Moreover, issuing firms have book and market leverage ratios substantially higher than those of matching nonissuers even after equity issuance, an observation inconsistent with the leverage explanation of the underperformance.
We complement the Schultz (2003) pseudo-market-timing explanation in two ways. First, we provide an economic explanation for his key premise that firms are more likely to issue when stock prices are high so they can receive more for their equity. We show that optimal equity financing is highly procyclical; firms invest more and thus naturally issue more equity in expansions when stock prices are relatively high. Second, our argument applies to calendar-time as well as event-time evidence because the model predicts that issuing firms are expected to earn lower ex-ante rates of returns.
Conclusion
We use a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly equity financing as a laboratory to study the quantitative relations between stock returns and equity financing.
We find that the model can simultaneously and in many cases quantitatively reproduce: procyclical equity issuance waves; the predictive relation between aggregate equity share and stock market returns; long-term underperformance following equity issuance and the positive correlation of its magnitude with the volume of issuance; the mean-reverting behavior in the operating performance of issuing firms; the positive long-term stock price drift for cashdistributing firms and the positive correlation of its magnitude with book-to-market ratio; the mean-reverting behavior in the operating performance of cash-distributing firms; and the negative cross-sectional correlation between capital investment and average returns and the positive relation of the magnitude of this correlation with the ratios of cash flows to assets.
Perhaps more important, our rational expectations model does not admit any systematic mispricing. We thus conclude that the return-related evidence often interpreted as behavioral market timing or a window-of-opportunity theory of financing decisions under inefficient markets can in principle be consistent with efficient markets and rational expectations.
One issue remains open. Although going in the right direction, our quantitative results on the positive long-term stock price drift following cash distribution and the positive relation between its magnitude and book-to-market are somewhat weak. Improving the quantitative performance of the model along this dimension seems important.
Brav, Alon, Christopher Geczy, and Paul A. Gompers, 2000, Is the abnormal return Table 1 
: Parameter Choices
This table reports our parameter choices. We need to calibrate 14 parameters: the capital share α; the longrun average level of aggregate productivityx; the persistence of aggregate productivity ρ x ; the conditional volatility of aggregate productivity shocks σ x ; the persistence of firm-specific productivity ρ z ; the conditional volatility of firm-specific productivity shocks σ z ; the three parameters in the stochastic discount factor η, γ 0 , and γ 1 ; the fixed cost of production f ; the rate of capital depreciation δ; the adjustment-cost parameter a; the fixed cost of financing λ 0 ; and the proportional factor of financing costs λ 1 .
0.70 −3.751 0.95 1/3 0.007/3 0.965 0.100 0.994 50 −1000 0.005 0.01 15 0.08 0.025 This table reports unconditional sample moments generated from the simulated data and from the real data. We simulate 100 artificial panels each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observation. We report the cross-simulation averaged results. The average Sharpe ratio in the data is from Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . The data moments of the real interest rate are from Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) . All other data moments are from Hennessy and Whited (2005 This table reports conditional moments of equity issuance from simulated panels. We report the average frequency of equity issuance, the rate of aggregate equity financing, and the share of new equity in total financing, all conditional on the economy being in expansions or contractions. We define expansions in simulated panels to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional standard deviation above its long-run average, i.e., x t >x + σx √ 1−ρ 2
x , and we define contractions to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional standard deviation below its long-run average, i.e., x t <x− σx √ 1−ρ 2
x . The relative frequency of equity issuance is defined in the model as
the indicator function that takes a value of one if firm j issues equity and zero otherwise, and N = 5, 000 is the total number of firms in the simulated economy. The rate of aggregate equity financing is defined as the total amount of new equity divided by total assets, i.e., P N j=1 ejt P N j=1 kjt . Because we do not model debt, we measure the new equity share as the share of new equity out of total financing including both new equity and internal funds, i.e., P N j=1 ejt P N j=1 (ejt +yjt) . For simulations create 100 artificial panels each with 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. The table reports the cross-simulation averaged results. , and stock market volatility estimated using the rolling prior 36 months of simulated data. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the regressions on each simulated panel and report the crosssimulation average results. The numbers in parentheses are the cross-simulation averaged t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations of up to 12 lags. This table reports univariate, predictive regressions of annual percentage stock market returns on three regressors. The regression equation is r t+1 = a + bX t + e t+1 , where r t denotes the real percentage returns on the value-weighted (vw) market portfolio or the equally-weighted (ew) market portfolio. X t denotes the regressors including the dividend-to-price ratio, the book-to-market ratio, or the new equity share in the sum of total new equity and internal funds. The dividend-to-price ratio, the book-to-market ratio, and the equity share in new issues are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the predictive regressions on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation averaged slopes and test statistics. For comparison, we also report in data columns the results from Table 3 of Baker and Wurgler (2000) . Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions:
where r jt+1 denotes the percentage return on firm j during month t. ME jt is the market value of firm j on the most recent fiscal year ending before month t. BM jt is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity for firm j on the most recent fiscal year ending before month t. And ISSUE jt is a dummy variable that equals one if firm j has conducted at least once equity offerings within the past 60 months preceding month t, and equals zero otherwise. The light-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction of issuing firms below its median, and the heavy-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction of issuing firms above its median. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. We then perform the cross-sectional regressions on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation averaged slopes and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics. We also compare our results to those reported in Loughran and Ritter (1995, Panels A and B report the median operating performance measures for the issuing and matching firms. Panels C and D report the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the issuers and matching nonissuers using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs singed-ranks test. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. The monthly flow variables are aggregated within a given year to create annual variables. Stock variables are measured at the beginning of the year. We perform the tests on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average results. We also compare our results to those reported in Table II of Loughran and Ritter (1997) .
Event year
Operating Profitability Investment-Market-to-book income-to-asset to-asset This table reports annual and compounded buy-and-hold percentage returns following share repurchases for up to four years. Compounded holdingperiod returns assume annual rebalancing. We form equally-weighted portfolios for the whole sample. We construct the reference portfolio using benchmark returns corresponding to the repurchase sample, matched on the basis of size and book-to-market ranking. To form reference portfolio, we sort all firms in our simulated panel each month into one of 50 size and book-to-market portfolios (the intersections of ten size deciles and five book-to-market quintiles). We rank all firms in the beginning of the calendar year and hold them for the following 12 months. Beginning in the next month, we calculate the one-year buy-and-hold return for each firm in a given portfolio. We then use the equal-weighted average of all annual returns in a given portfolio as the benchmark returns for firms ranked in that particular size and book-to-market portfolio. We rebalance the portfolio annually. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the empirical analysis on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average results. We also compare our results to those reported in Table 3 of Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) . This table reports annual and compounded buy-and-hold percentage returns for equally-weighted portfolios of firms distributing cash for up to four years following market share repurchases by book-to-market quintile ranking. Compounded holding-period returns assume annual rebalancing. Ranks are determined by sorting all firms into size deciles. Each decile is further sorted into quintiles on the basis of book-to-market, with the lowest ratios assigned to quintile one. We form the reference portfolio using benchmark returns corresponding to the repurchase sample, matched on the basis of size and book-to-market ranking. We create 100 artificial panels of 5000 firms each and with 480 observations for each firm. The unit time period is one month. We perform these analysis on each simulated panel and report across-simulation averaged results, and we compare our results to those reported in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, This table reports levels of and changes in quarterly operating performance around announcements of cash distribution. In the model, operating performance is measured as operating income scaled by assets, yit kjt , at the beginning and end of the fiscal quarter. Quarter 0 is the fiscal quarter of the announcement. Industry-adjusted operating performance is the paired difference between the operating performance of the sample firms and the operating performance of their respective industry-and size-matched control firms. Performance-adjusted operating performance is the paired difference between the operating performance of the sample firms and the operating performance of their respective industry-, performance-, and market-to-book-matched control firms. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the empirical analysis on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average results. We also compare our results to those reported in Table 3 of Lie (2005) Panel A presents the distribution of excess returns on five CI portfolios and the CI-spread portfolio. CI denotes the capital-investment measure based on investment-to-asset ratio. We report the monthly mean excess returns, the standard deviation, the maximum, the median, and the minimum of the excess returns. The CI portfolios are constructed as follows. In year t, all stocks are sorted into quintiles based on their CI measures in ascending order to form five CI portfolios. Value-weighted monthly excess returns on a portfolio are calculated from year t to year t+1. The excess return on an individual stock at time t is calculated by subtracting the returns of characteristic-based benchmark portfolios from the stock return at time t. The CI-spread denotes the zero-investment portfolio that has a long position in the two lowest CI portfolios and a short position in the two highest CI portfolios. The return series for this portfolio is calculated by subtracting the sum of the returns on the highest two portfolios from that on the two lowest CI portfolios, and then dividing the result by two. All portfolios are rebalanced annually. Panel B reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression: r jt+1 = λ 0t + λ 1t CI jt + λ 2t CI jt DCF jt + jt+1 , where r jt+1 is the benchmark-adjusted value-weighted return on individual stock j at during month t. DCF is the dummy variable based on cash flow, measured as operating income scaled by total assets, measured in the model as yjt kjt . If the cash flow of one firm is above the median cash flow of the year, its DCF equals one, and zero otherwise. We simulate 100 artificial panels, each of which has 5000 firms and 480 monthly observations. The monthly flow variables are aggregated within one given year to create their corresponding annual variables. We perform the tests on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average slopes and test statistics. We also compare our results to those reported in √ " indicates that the explanation for the long-run underperformance of equity issuers also predicts the other feature of equity issuer performance.
A "?" indicates that it is not clear whether the explanation also predicts the other characteristic of issuer performance. Behavioral market timing argues that managers can create value for existing shareholders by timing financing decisions to exploit time-varying relative costs of debt and equity caused by inefficient markets and investors underreact to the pricing implications of corporate financing decisions (Ritter 1991 (Ritter , 2003 Loughran and Ritter 1995; Baker and Wurgler 2000) . Inadequate risk adjustment argues that external-financing-related anomalies arise because empirical expectedreturn models are misspecified (Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 2000; Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 2000) . Pseudo market timing is from Schultz (2003) . And optimal market timing proposed in this paper, built on previous contributions of Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005a, 2005b) and Pastor and Veronesi 2005), argues that optimal investment is more likely to be the fundamental driving force behind the external-financing anomalies and other related stylized facts. The block of the table including the first nine rows and the first three columns is borrowed from Schultz's This figure plots the value function v(k, z, x) and the investment-to-asset ratio i k (k, z, x) as functions of one endogenous state variable k, and two exogenous state variables x and z. Because there are three state variables, we fix x =x and plot the value and policy functions against k and z in Panels A and C, respectively, in which the arrows indicate the direction along which z increases. We then fix z =z and plot the value and policy functions against k and x in Panels B and D, respectively, in which the arrows indicate the direction along which x increases. This figure plots the new equity-to-asset ratio e k (k, z, x) and the payout-to-asset ratio d k (k, z, x) as functions of one endogenous state variable, capital stock k, and two exogenous state variables, aggregate and firmspecific productivity x and z. Because there are three state variables, we fix x =x and plot the functions against k and z in Panels A and C, in which the arrows indicate the direction along which z increases. In Panels B and D, we fix z =z and plot the functions against k and x, and the arrows indicate the direction along which x increases. 
